How much green for the buck? estimating additional and windfall effects of french agro-environmental schemes by did-matching by Chabé-Ferret, Sylvain & Subervie, Julie
Contents lists available at SciVerse ScienceDirect
Journal of
Environmental Economics and Management
Journal of Environmental Economics and Management 65 (2013) 12–270095-06
http://d
n Corr
France.
E-mjournal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/jeemHow much green for the buck? Estimating additional and
windfall effects of French agro-environmental schemes by
DID-matching
Sylvain Chabe´-Ferret a,b,n, Julie Subervie a,c
a Irstea, UMR 1273 Me´tafort, F-63170 Aubiere, France
b Yale University, Department of Economics, Cowles Foundation, New Haven, CT, USA
c INRA, UMR 1110 MOISA, F-34000 Montpellier, Francea r t i c l e i n f o
Article history:
Received 19 July 2010
Available online 2 October 2012
Keywords:
Agro-environmental schemes
Additionality
Windfall effects
Treatment effects
Difference in difference matching
Agricultural practices
Crop diversity
Cover crops
Grass buffer strips
Organic farming96/$ - see front matter & 2012 Elsevier Inc. A
x.doi.org/10.1016/j.jeem.2012.09.003
esponding author at: Toulouse School of Eco
Fax: þ33 5 61 12 85 20.
ail address: sylvain.chabe-ferret@toulouse.inra b s t r a c t
Agro-environmental schemes (AES), which pay farmers to adopt greener practices, are
increasingly important components of environmental and agricultural policies both in the
US and the EU. Here we study the French implementation of the EU AES program.
We estimate additional and windfall effects of five AESs for a representative sample of
individual farmers using difference-in-difference (DID) matching. We derive the statistical
assumptions underlying DID-matching from a structural household model and we argue
that the economics of the program make it likely that these assumptions hold in our data.
We test the implications of the identifying assumptions, provide a lower bound using
triple-difference matching, test for crossover effects and insert our estimates of both
additionality and windfall effects into a cost-benefit framework. We find that the AESs
promoting crop diversity have inserted one new crop into the rotation but on a small part
of the cropped area. We also find that the AES subsidizing the planting of cover crops has
increased cover crops by 10 ha on the average recipient farm at the expense of almost 7 ha
of windfall effect. This AES does not appear to be cost effective. In contrast, we find that the
AES subsidizing grass buffer strips could be socially efficient despite large windfall effects.
We finally estimate that the AES subsidizing conversion to organic farming has low
windfall effects and high additionality.
& 2012 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.1. Introduction
Payments for environmental services are widely used to improve environmental outcomes. Agro-environmental schemes
(AESs), which pay farmers for adopting greener practices, are increasingly important components of environmental and
agricultural policies both in the US and the EU. In this paper, we study the French implementation of the EU AES program.
The AESs that we study aim to alter agricultural practices in order to improve the environment. Two of the AESs aim to increase
crop diversity, which in turn may increase the diversity of habitats, and thus biodiversity. Increased crop diversity may also
reduce the resistance of weeds to pesticides by diversifying rotations on the same field. Another AES that we study subsidizes the
planting of cover crops during the winter, which curbs erosion and prevents nitrogen leaching into groundwater. We also study
an AES that subsidizes the planting of grass buffer strips along rivers and streams. Grass buffer strips contribute to thell rights reserved.
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that subsidizes conversion to organic farming. Organic farming bans the use of chemical fertilizers and pesticides, thereby
reducing the transmission of pollutants into ground and surface water.
Cost-benefit analysis of these programs hinges on the relative extent of their additional and windfall effects. An AES has
an additional effect if it encourages farmers to adopt environmentally friendly practices, i.e. if it has a positive causal effect
on practices that favor the environment. An AES suffers from windfall effects if it pays for practices that would have been
adopted in its absence. Higher additionality improves the efficiency of the program and thus increases the benefit/cost
ratio. Higher windfall effects, on the contrary, tend to decrease the efficiency of the program by using resources to pay for
practices that would have been adopted anyway, and thus decreases the benefit/cost ratio. Because AESs are voluntary
programs and requirements and per-hectare payments are constant for all farmers, the potential for adverse selection is
very high: farmers with the lowest costs of complying with the requirements of a given AES are the most likely to enter it.
Thus, it is very likely that farmers who self-select into an AES would in any case have adopted the subsidized green
practice to some extent had the AES not been implemented. In this paper, we estimate additional and windfall effects of
the five AESs described above for a representative sample of French farmers. We use a detailed sample of individual
farmers for whom we have data on practices related to the AESs under study (crops planted, area under cover crops, grass
buffer strips, and organic farming) recorded in 2005, five years after the beginning of the program. We also have data on
farm and farmers’ characteristics and practices before the program started. Finally, we have detailed and disaggregated
information from administrative sources on the AESs that each farmer has entered.
Determining the average level of a given practice for recipient farmers had the AES not existed, i.e. the counterfactual
level, is key to the estimation of both additional and windfall effects. The windfall effect is identical to the counterfactual
level. The average treatment effect on the treated (ATT) - the relevant causal effect measuring additionality - is the
difference between the average level of a practice in the presence of the AES and the counterfactual level of the same
practice. Unfortunately, we cannot observe the counterfactual situation. This is an instance of the fundamental problem of
causal inference [16]. If we try to approximate the counterfactual level for recipient farmers by using non-recipient
farmers, our estimates of the ATT are likely to be affected by selection bias. As a consequence, we may overstate the true
level of additionality. Profit-maximizing farmers self-selecting into an AES indeed have lower costs of complying with the
AES requirements. It is therefore likely that farmers who choose to enter an AES would in any case have adopted greener
practices than farmers not entering it, had the AES not been implemented.
We use difference-in-difference (DID) matching [2,15] to eliminate selection bias and to estimate the ATT.
DID-matching combines a non-parametric matching procedure with first-differencing with respect to a pre-treatment
period. Matching eliminates selection bias due to observed covariates by comparing recipient farmers to similar non-
recipients. First-differencing eliminates selection bias due to time-invariant unobservable factors. The validity of DID-
matching relies on three assumptions. First, the absence of diffusion effects of the AESs on non-recipient farmers. Second,
the existence of non-recipient farmers similar to recipient farmers in terms of observed covariates. Third, in the absence of
any AES, the difference in practices between recipient and similar non-recipient farmers is constant over time. We derive
the statistical assumptions underlying DID-matching from a structural household model and we argue that the economics
of the program make it likely that the identifying assumptions of DID-matching hold in our data. Moreover, we test the
validity of various implications of these assumptions and find evidence in their favor. We test for the presence of diffusion
effects by inserting the initial average level of a given practice among neighboring farmers as a control variable. We find no
difference in estimated treatment effects with or without this additional control variable suggesting that diffusion effects
are absent. We test for the existence of similar farmers by using Smith and Todd [32]’s common support estimation
procedure. We generally find that non-recipient farmers do exist for most of our treated farmers. Finally, we test for the
constancy of the average difference in practices between recipients and non-recipients in the absence of the program by
implementing a placebo test. We compare future recipients to future non-recipients at two different dates. We find effects
of smaller magnitude than the ATT, and evidence that these are anticipation effects: because the date at which the
requirements will become really binding is uncertain, farmers start complying with the requirements early on. Indeed,
these anticipation effects vanish when we look at recipients who enter an AES at a later stage. We nevertheless provide a
lower bound on the treatment effect by providing estimates from triple-difference (DDD) matching. Finally, because
farmers can enter multiple AESs and we want to perform a separate cost-benefit analysis for each AES, we test and find
strong support for the absence of sizeable crossover effects for most AESs under study.
We find that the average recipient farm has planted 10 additional hectares of cover crops, at the expense of almost 7 ha
of windfall effect. Because the per-hectare payment for this AES is quite high, and because the social value of cover crops is
limited, this AES does not appear to be cost effective. On the contrary, we find that the AES subsidizing grass buffer strips
could very well be cost effective, despite very large windfall effects, because grass buffer strips are very efficient at curbing
the runoff of pollutants. We finally estimate that the AES subsidizing conversion to organic farming has very low windfall
effects and very high additionality. According to our estimates, this AES is responsible for 90% of the increase in areas
converted to organic farming between 2000 and 2005. We estimate that it costs 151 h to convert one additional hectare to
organic farming, compared to an average estimated social benefit from organic farming of 540 h=ha. We cannot apply a
complete cost-benefit analysis to the AESs aiming at increasing crop diversity because payments were not directly tied to a
practice that we can observe. We nevertheless estimate that these measures triggered the planting of 0.65–0.85 new
species on treated farms, but on a very limited proportion of the total farmland, resulting in a small decrease in the
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aims of these AESs, only requiring farmers to add one crop to the rotation, might explain the very limited effects measured.
Overall, we find strong evidence of adverse selection, which induces large windfall effects. We find that the AESs
combining restrictive requirements with large payments, such as the one subsidizing conversion to organic farming, are
the most efficient schemes.
Our paper is not the first attempt at measuring the effects of AESs. The AESs in the EU are similar to the conservation reserve
program (CRP) in the US, in the sense that the government offers individual farmers or firms temporary subsidies in exchange for
voluntary changes in agricultural practices that are expected to generate environmental benefits—to reduce crop acreage in this
case. Early works include Lynch and Liu [24] and Lynch et al. [23], who focus on the impact of these AESs on land prices. Wu [37]
and Roberts and Bucholtz [26] run OLS and 2SLS regressions to test the hypothesis that acreage reductions due to CRP have been
offset by increases in cropland in other areas. Smith and Goodwin [33] estimate a five-equation structural model of CRP
participation, soil erosion, crop insurance participation, conservation, and fertilizer usage, using a 2SLS procedure, to determine
the impact of CRP on soil erosion. Wu et al. [38] jointly estimate crop choice and the decision to use conservation tillage and
simulate the effects of CRP on erosion and nitrogen leaching, and runoff. Roberts and Lubowski [27] model the decision to
establish crops using a binomial probit regression to predict the likelihood that each CRP contract will return to crop production
if the program was to expire once and for all. Most, if not all, econometric studies of CRP are based on a county level database
from the United States Department of Agriculture’s National Resources Inventory, although econometric models are based on
individual farmers’ decisions to enroll land in CRP and change land use. In addition to the empirical literature on AES evaluation,
a growing number of empirical works aim to estimate the effects of the US Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) voluntary
programs or voluntary international standards (e.g. ISO14001) on firms’ environmental performances. They run a linear 2SLS
regression on micro-data to estimate the impact of voluntary programs on the release of toxins and on the economic
performance of firms in the US [4,18] and in developing countries [8]. Arimura et al. [5] use maximum simulated likelihood
along with the GHK simulator to estimate the impact of the implementation of ISO14001 and publication of environmental
reports on the environmental performance of Japanese facilities. The paper which is perhaps the closest to our own is the
study by Pufahl and Weiss [25] of the effect of benefiting from at least one AES on farm sales, fertilizer expenditure, and
cattle livestock density measured from the bookkeeping records of a non-representative sample of German farms. This
study shows that AESs decreased the use of agrochemicals and increased grassland area.
This paper is organized as follows: the implementation of AESs in France is presented in Section 2; the theoretical
model and identification strategy are discussed in Section 3; the data used in the paper are presented in Section 4; results
of estimations by DID-matching and robustness checks are presented in Section 5; the cost-benefit analysis is presented in
Section 6 and Section 7 concludes.
2. Agro-environmental schemes in France
AESs accounted for 37% of rural development spending for the common agricultural policy (CAP) of the European Union
in 2006 [25]. The future reform of the CAP will involve a major ‘‘greening’’ of all subsidies. As a result, a growing share of
CAP spending will take the form of AESs. Taken together, the AESs we study accounted for 22% of total spending on AES in
France in 2006.
AESs are five-year contracts, with yearly payments and possible checks of how well the requirements are being met.
Farmers may enroll only part of their farm under an AES, and combine different AESs on the same part of their farm or on
different parts. Farmers receive the same payment per hectare for a given AES. These payments have been calculated so as
to compensate an average farmer for the profit loss following the adoption of the practice. Total payments are proportional
to the area to which the farmer declares she will apply the scheme. In this paper, we focus on seven AESs. AES 0301
(resp. 04) subsidizes the planting of cover crops (resp. grass buffer strips) and thus contributes to the reduction of nitrogen,
phosphorus, and pesticide leakage (resp. runoff) from fields. This in turn decreases the concentrations of pollutants in
surface and ground waters. AESs 08 and 09 aim to decrease the levels of pesticides and nitrogen applied to the fields,
which might also decrease leakage and runoff. AES 21 encourages conversion to organic farming, a practice that has been
shown to be friendlier to the environment than conventional farming. AESs 0201 and 0205 both aim to increase the
diversity of crop rotation, but the former requires the addition of one crop to the rotation whereas the latter requires that
at least four different crops be grown on the farm.
Farmers who wanted to benefit from an AES during this period had to submit a written application containing an
environmental diagnosis of their farm and the particular measures they were applying for. An administrative body then
had to approve or refuse the application. Almost all applications were approved. A contract was then signed, stipulating
the farmer’s commitments and a schedule of annual payments. The time between a farmer’s application and the signing of
the contract was at least a year. In order to submit a valid application, farmers could obtain assistance from local union-run
bodies called Chambres de´partementales d’Agriculture (CA). The amount of assistance given to individual farmers by each CA
varied widely across France because right-wing CAs opposed the implementation of these contracts, which formed part of
a policy introduced by a left-wing government. In 2003, an unexpected surge in the number of applications led the newly
elected government to temporarily freeze the scheme. Contracts were gradually reinstated with an informal restriction on
the total payments that an individual farmer could receive. This delay had not been anticipated by those farmers who had
applied to the AES program; as a result they altered their practices before being officially recorded as beneficiaries.
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In this section, we model an agricultural household deciding whether or not to take part in a unique AES program and
then choosing its level of input. Identification assumptions are then presented as restrictions on this model. Finally, we
deal with the complexities of the real world scenario in which farmers can simultaneously choose multiple AESs.
3.1. Modeling farmers’ participation in an AES
We model a household making two sequential decisions. First, it decides whether or not to enter an AES. Second, the
household chooses the level of inputs that maximizes its utility in relation to the AES constraints. We solve this problem by
backward induction, so that we first focus on production decisions and how the AES impacts them, and then consider the
household’s decision to enter the scheme.1
3.1.1. Input choices with and without the AES
The household produces only one agricultural good, whose price is pQ, in quantity Q, by combining a variable input Ywhose
price is pY with household labor (H) and other factors of production. These consist of the fixed factors possessed by the
household, like physical and human capital and land, stored in the vector I and unobserved (by the evaluator but not by the
farmer) factors like managerial ability, land quality, and climate variations, gathered in the vector e . The production function F
is such that: Q ¼ FðY ,H,I,e Þ. Among the unobserved factors e , we distinguish between factors fixed over time (like managerial
ability and land quality, noted as l) and those that vary over time (like climate variations, noted as e). We thus have e ¼ ðl,eÞ.
When a household has entered an AES (D¼1) it receives payments P as compensation for making restricted use of inputs Y,
so that YrY .2 The household derives income from farming but also from working Hoff hours off the farm for a wage w.
It derives utility from consumption C, leisure L, on-farmwork [22,10], and may exhibit a particular distaste for some inputs, due
for example to ecological preferences. Heterogeneity in tastes is described by two vectors: observed consumption shifters
(family size, age of children, etc.): S and unobserved taste shifters: g. Here again we make a distinction between unobserved
shifters that are fixed over time (like ecological preferences, taste for work on the farm, noted d) and time-varying idiosyncratic
taste shifters (like non-farm profit opportunities, noted n). We thus have g¼ ðd,nÞ. The problem the household faces is
max
C,L,H,Hoff ,Y
UðC,L,H,Y ,S,gÞ, ð1Þ
subject to:
C ¼ pQQpYYþwHoff þDP, ð2Þ
Q ¼ FðY ,H,I,eÞ, ð3Þ
DðYY Þr0, ð4Þ
LþHþHoff ¼ T, ð5Þ
where T is the total time available to the household. The first order condition for the input level is (with lY the Lagrange
multiplier associated with the input constraint)
@U
@C
pQ
@F
@Y
pY
 
þ @U
@Y
lYD¼ 0: ð6Þ
In the absence of the AES (i.e. when D¼0 in Eq. (6)), the household chooses the input level Y0 that equalizes the marginal
increase in utility, due to a marginal increase in agricultural profits, with the marginal disutility of using inputs. This level
depends on all the exogenous variables of the problem, including household characteristics S and g, as production decisions are
not separable from consumption:3
Y0 ¼ g0ðpQ ,pY ,w,T ,I,S,e ,gÞ: ð7Þ
When in the AES (i.e. when D¼1 in Eq. (6)), either the input constraint is binding, so that Y1 ¼ Y , or the input constraint is not
binding (lY ¼ 0), and Y1rY . Generally, we have1 We do not explicitly model the dynamic behavior of farmers. Dynamics could play an important role if there are large learning requirements for
entering a scheme or if the sunk costs for changing practices are large. We do not think that this is the case for most of the practices we study, with the
exception of organic farming. Farmers wishing to convert to organic farming may have delayed their decision in order to benefit from AES 21. For our
estimates to be correct, we have to assume that the costs of entering the schemes were not anticipated by the farmers, so that some of those who delayed
could not enter the scheme at a reasonable cost. This is an application of the general result of Abbring and Heckman [3] that a structural dynamic model
with the assumptions in Rust [30] implies conditional exogeneity that justifies matching in a dynamic framework.
2 The discussion of our identification strategy derived from this special case extends to the other AESs we have studied.
3 This equation is a solution to the set of first-order conditions of the household’s problem, including those related to labor that is not shown here.
We assume properties of the problem so that such a solution exists.
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Y1 and Y0 are called potential outcomes. The individual-level causal effect of the AES (DY ) is the difference between the input
level chosen by the household if it enters the AES and the input level it chooses if it does not enter the AES: DY ¼ Y1Y0.
The observed input choice Y depends on whether or not the farmer has entered the AES: Y ¼ Y1DþY0ð1DÞ. The individual-
level causal effect of the AES is thus not observable, since only one of the two potential input choices is observed. This is an
instance of the fundamental problem of causal inference [16].
The causal effect might vary across the population. Indeed, constrained households (for which lY40) have to decrease
their level of inputs in order to cope with the AES constraints (DYo0). Unconstrained households (for which lY ¼ 0) could
enter the AES at no cost, i.e. without modifying their agricultural practices, so that the program has no effect on them
(DY ¼ 0).4 These households would thus benefit from a pure windfall effect; they receive a subsidy but do not have to
change their practices at all in order to comply with the AES requirements.
In this paper, we try to recover the average treatment effect on the treated (ATT), which is the average effect of the AES
on those who have chosen to enter it: ATT ¼ E½DY 9D¼ 1. The sign and magnitude of the ATT will depend on the relative
proportions of constrained and unconstrained households in the pool of participants. Note that, as constrained households
bear a larger entry cost than unconstrained households, the latter are likely to be more strongly represented in the pool of
participants than in the whole population. It is thus unsure whether the ATT is strictly positive. In the extreme case of a
program attracting only unconstrained households, the ATT may very well be null.3.1.2. Farmers’ decision to enter the AES
Let V1 and V0 denote the indirect utility of the household when it is respectively in or out of the AES program, as defined
by Eqs. (1)–(5). They depend on the same variables as Y1 and Y0. Let V denote the disutility of applying for the AES in the
first period. It depends on the time spent preparing the application, which may vary depending on the level of education,
participation in past programs, and possible assistance provided by agricultural unions. The household decides to enter the
AES only if the expected gain in utility is higher than the costs of application:
D¼ 1½E½V1V09I VZ0, ð9Þ
where I denotes the set of information available to the agents when deciding whether or not to participate in the AES.
Selection bias arises because some determinants of farmers’ participation stored in I are also determinants of input
demands. As a consequence, participants and non participants will differ in terms of fixed factors of production (I), land
quality and managerial ability (l), consumption shifters (S), and ecological preferences (d). Comparing them may thus
overstate the causal effect of the program, as participants may use fewer inputs than non-participants in the absence of the
program:
E½Y9D¼ 1E½Y9D¼ 0 ¼ E½Y19D¼ 1E½Y09D¼ 1þE½Y09D¼ 1E½Y09D¼ 0 ð10Þ
¼ ATTþE½Y09E½V1V09I ZV E½Y09E½V1V09I oV |fflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflffl{zfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflffl}
selection bias
: ð11Þ3.2. Identification strategy
Matching estimators assume that outcomes are mean independent of program participation conditional on a set of
observable characteristics: E½Y09D¼ 1,Z ¼ E½Y09D¼ 0,Z. However, for a variety of reasons there may be systematic differences
between participants’ and nonparticipants’ outcomes in the absence of the program, even conditional on observables.
This could lead to a violation of the identification conditions required for matching. A DID-matching strategy, as defined in
Heckman et al. [15], allows for temporally invariant unobserved differences in outcomes between participants and
nonparticipants that closely resemble fixed effects in panel data. Differencing the outcomes eliminates the selection bias
due to these unobservable factors. The conditional parallel trend assumption that underlies DID-matching is: E½Y0tY0t0 9
D¼ 1,Z ¼ E½Y0tY0t0 9D¼ 0,Z, with t (resp. t0) a post (resp. pre) treatment date. This means that observationally equivalent
treated and non-treated individuals should exhibit the same change in input decisions in the absence of treatment, i.e. that
their average difference in input use should be constant over time. DID-matching estimates are obtained by applying matching
to the outcomes differenced with respect to a pre-treatment period. Three assumptions are needed to ensure that DID-
matching recovers the ATT: the Stable Unit Treatment Value Assumption (SUTVA), the assumption of conditional parallel
trends and the common support assumption. In what follows, we formulate these assumptions as restrictions on our model,
discuss their relevance and propose tests of their implications.4 Unconstrained households may also change their practices because of an income effect due to the payment P.
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Rubin [29]’s SUTVA assumes that the program has no effect on non-participants. In our model, this is achieved through
the following restriction:
Assumption 1 (SUTVA). The level of prices ðpQ ,pY ,wÞ, the distribution of observed and unobserved determinants of input
use ðT,I,S,e ,gÞ and the function g0 remain the same whether the AES is implemented or not.
Because the AESs that we study have a low take-up rate, and input and output prices are mainly determined on the
world market, we do not expect the AESs to have any effects on input and output prices.5 This assumption also rules out
imitation effects or increasing returns, due for example to several farmers creating a co-op to sell their organic products.
Without any prior evidence for this assertion, we set up a test of the validity of SUTVA based on the proportion of
neighboring farmers adopting a given practice before anyone enters a scheme.
3.2.2. The assumption of conditional parallel trends
A crucial identification assumption in DID-matching is that of parallel trends [2,15,25]. It states that, in the absence of
the program, the average change in input use is the same among participants and observationally equivalent non-
participants. In our economic model, the validity of this assumption requires the three following restrictions to hold:
Assumption 2 (Conditional parallel trends). The three following conditions must hold simultaneously:(i)5
large
Assum
6I ¼ fP,Y ,pQ ,pY ,w,T ,I,S,l,dg,
(ii) ðV ,l,dÞ@ðe,nÞ9ðT ,I,SÞ and ðe,nÞ9ðT ,I,SÞ is identically distributed,
(iii) ( functions l0 and m0 such that: Y0 ¼ l0ðT ,I,S,l,d,e,nÞþm0ðpQ ,pY ,w,T,I,S,e,nÞ.Part (i) of Assumption 2 states that a farmer’s decision to enter an AES does not depend on time-varying unobserved factors
e (climate variations) or n (idiosyncratic wage variations). This ensures that selection for the program is based either on
observed variables or on unobserved variables fixed over time. This assumption seems realistic because participation in AESs is
decided two to five years before practices are observed, meaning that farmers may not be able to forecast the level of the
transitory determinants of input use e and n when deciding to enter the program. Part (ii) of Assumption 2 implies that all the
dependence between V and Y0 is due either to observed covariates or to unobserved time-constant shifters (l and d). It also
means that transitory variations in productivity cannot be correlated to long-term determinants of productivity or tastes. Such
assumptions can reasonably hold, as knowing the long-term mean climate does not help to forecast the climatic anomalies
around this mean level for a given year. Part (ii) also requires time-varying idiosyncratic shocks to be identically distributed.
Part (iii) of Assumption 2 is a way to deal with the bias due to unobserved time-constant factors (l and d). It requires
that the effect of the unobserved time-constant shifters on input demand be additively separable from the effect of
time-varying covariates (e.g. prices). As a consequence, the average difference in practices between participants and
observationally identical non-participants must be constant over time in the absence of treatment.
Under Assumption 2, in the absence of the AES, participants’ and non participants’ average practices follow parallel
trends conditional on observed variables:
E½Y0itY0it0 9Di ¼ 1,Ti,Ii,Si ¼ E½Y0itY0it0 9Di ¼ 0,Ti,Ii,Si: ð12Þ
Though it seems difficult to justify on theoretical grounds, Assumption 2 is fortunately testable. We use placebo tests that
apply the identification strategy between two pre-treatment years, t0 and t00, when no effect should be detected. We find
some evidence that the common trend assumption may not hold in our data. We interpret this as anticipation effects.
Another interpretation could be that farmers follow specific trends in the adoption of practices. If we weaken Assumption
2 and model input level as a linear random trend,6 the matching version of the triple-differences (DDD) estimator of
Heckman and Hotz [14] yields an unbiased estimate of the treatment effect. We implement this estimator as an additional
check of robustness yielding a lower bound on the ATT.
3.2.3. The common support assumption
In order to apply the DID-matching estimator, non-participants having the same observed characteristics T, I, and S
must exist for each participant. A sufficient condition for this to hold is:
Assumption 3 (Common support). PrðV4E½V1V09I 9T ,I,SÞ40.
Assumption 3 states that, for each level of the observed variables, some farmers have participation costs higher than the
expected utility of entering the AES program. The set of values of T, I, and S for which this assumption is satisfied is called
the zone of common support [15]. This assumption has empirical content because among households with the sameIn contrast, measures favoring extensive management of meadows are chosen by almost the entire eligible population, and the price of land is
ly determined at a local level. Being able to consider the impact of different measures separately enables us to focus only on the measures for which
ption 1 is most likely to hold.
This alternative Assumption 20(iii) is: ( functions l0, m0, and k0 such that: Y0t ¼ l0ðT ,I,S,l,d,e,nÞþtk0ðT ,I,S,l,d,e,nÞþm0ðpQ ,pY ,w,T ,I,S,e,nÞ.
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substantial assistance from agricultural unions at the local level. V thus acts as an unobserved instrumental variable; it
determines treatment intake but is uncorrelated to time-varying determinants of potential outcomes.
As a conclusion to this section, under Assumptions 1–3, DID-matching identifies the ATT:7
ATT ¼ E½E½YitYit0 9Di ¼ 1,Ti,Ii,SiE½YitYit0 9Di ¼ 0,Ti,Ii,Si9Di ¼ 1: ð13Þ
3.3. Definition of treatment effects with multiple treatments
In practice, farmers can choose from several AESs and may combine two or more of them. This makes no difference
with respect to the way we have encoded our identification assumptions, but it requires some care in defining treatment
effects. Let us suppose that there are two AESs, a and b and that farmers can enter either one or both. Let it be assumed that
AES a (resp. b) is designed to alter practice Ya (resp. b). Da (resp. Db) is a random variable equal to one when a farmer
chooses to enter AES a (resp. b) and zero otherwise. We can define four potential outcomes for each practice j 2 fa,bg
Yj ¼
Y11j if Dj ¼ 1 and Dj ¼ 1
Y10j if Dj ¼ 1 and Dj ¼ 0
Y01j if Dj ¼ 0 and Dj ¼ 1
Y00j if Dj ¼ 0 and Dj ¼ 0,
8>>><
>>>:
ð14Þ
where Dj refers to the AES that is not j (i.e. j¼ b when j¼a). Given that farmers generally enter various AESs at the same
time, we say that a farmer benefits from AES a if she receives payments at least for this AES (she may also receive
payments for other AESs). We define a farmer as being untreated if she receives no payment at all for any AES. So strictly
speaking, for the farmers who take AES a, the treatment effect we estimate in this paper is the average effect of taking AES
a (and any other AES that in practice has been associated with it) upon the practice it was meant to alter, relative to taking
no AES at all:
ATTa ¼ E½YaY00a 9Da ¼ 1 ð15Þ
¼ E½Y11a DbþY10a ð1DbÞY00a 9Da ¼ 1 ð16Þ
¼ E½Y11a Y00a 9Db ¼ 1,Da ¼ 1PrðDb ¼ 19Da ¼ 1ÞþE½Y10a Y00a 9Db ¼ 0,Da ¼ 1PrðDb ¼ 09Da ¼ 1Þ: ð17Þ
This parameter is a weighted average of the treatment effect on the respective subpopulations of AES a and b taken
together and of AES a taken alone. In order to use this parameter in cost-benefit analysis, we make the assumption that
only AES a (resp. b) matters for practice Ya (resp. Yb):
Assumption 4 (No crossover effects). For j 2 fa,bg, Y10j ¼ Y11j ¼ Y1j and Y00j ¼ Y01j ¼ Y0j .
Under this assumption, there is no indirect effect of AES b on Ya, and thus there are no complementarities between AESs
a and b. We can thus proceed to a separate cost-benefit analysis for each AES because we have:
ATTa ¼ E½Y1aY0a9Da ¼ 1: ð18Þ
This assumption has some empirical content, so it can be tested:DYit,tFirst, we can test whether there is a direct effect of AES b on Ya by estimating E½Y01a Y00a 9Db ¼ 1,Da ¼ 0. Second, we can test whether there is any additional effect of AES b on top of AES a by estimating E½Y11a Y10a 9Db ¼ 1,
Da ¼ 1.
4. Data
The empirical analysis is based on a database created especially for this study from a statistical survey of agricultural
practices conducted in 2003 and 2005 by the statistical services of the French Ministry of Agriculture (named ‘‘STRU’’)
paired to both the 2000 Agricultural Census (‘‘CA-2000’’) and several administrative files recording information on the
participation in each AES between 2000 and 2006. Creation of the database required a pairing procedure with several steps
to deal with the scattering of the data. It is extensively described in an online appendix, which can be accessed via www.
aere.org/journals. The sample extracted from ‘‘STRU’’ is representative of French farmers.7 Alternatively, under Assumptions 1, 20 , and 3, DDD-matching identifies the ATT: ATT ¼ E½E½DYit,t0 ,t00 9Di ¼ 1,Ti ,Ii ,SiE½DYit,t0 ,t00 9Di ¼ 0,Ti,Ii ,Si9Di ¼ 1 with
0 ,t00 ¼ YitYit0 ðtt00=t0t00ÞðYit0 Yit00 Þ.
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For each AES, participation is a binary variable taking a value of one when the surveyed farmer appears in administrative
files as receiving subsidies compensating him for meeting the requirements of the AES between 2000 and 2005, and a value of
zero when the surveyed farmer does not appear in the administrative files between 2000 and 2005. Because farmers may
benefit from several AESs, the participation variables partially overlap, as shown in the online appendix. The sample size and
the number of participants for the AESs we study in this paper are reported in the online appendix. The sample contains
between 400 and 3000 participants depending on the AES, which represents between 2000 and 14,000 participant farmers
nationwide. We also have access to almost 60,000 non-participants, representing 540,000 farmers nationwide.
4.2. Definition of the outcome variables
Several outcome variables are associated with each AES under study. Two outcome variables allow us to estimate the
impact of AESs 0301 and 04 which aim to reduce nitrogen carried by rainwater runoff: the surface area planted with cover
crops for soil nitrate recovery and the length of fertilizer-free grass buffer strips located at the edge of agricultural fields
which attenuate nitrate leaching. As cover crops may be a way to retain nitrogen during winter, we study whether farmers
participating in AES 09, which aims to curb the use of nitrogen fertilizers, have planted more cover crops, even when not
participating in AES 0301. The impact of AES 02, which aims to encourage crop diversification, is measured by four
outcome variables: the area dedicated to the main crop and the proportion of the total usable arable area (UAA) it covers,
the number of crops, and an index of evenness. Finally, we use two outcome variables to estimate the impact of the AES
which aims to encourage conversion to organic farming; the land area dedicated to organic farming and the land area
under conversion. All areas are measured in hectares. Pre-treatment outcomes are extracted from ‘‘CA-2000’’ and ‘‘STRU-
2003’’, the main exceptions being the area cultivated under organic farming (not measured in 2000) and the area covered
by grass buffer-strips (not measured in 2000 nor 2003).
4.3. Definition of control variables
The richness of the information in our database enables us to control for most of the important determinants of input
choice and of selection into the program listed in our theoretical model. We have data on production factors (equipment,
buildings, herd size and composition, composition and size of UAA, size of the labor force, age and education level of farm
associates, etc.) and on the consumption side (composition of the household, the main non-farm activity of the farmer and
his spouse, etc.). The dataset also includes measures of the technical orientation of the farm, quality labels, past experience
with previous AESs (1993–1999) and other agricultural policies.8,9 The main unobserved variables are thus managerial
ability, ecological preferences, and prices. All our control variables are measured at the farm level with the exception of
altitude, slope, agro-environmental zone, and soil carbon content, which are measured at the commune level.10
5. Results
In this section, first we present the practical implementation of DID-matching; then we present and discuss the results
of this estimation procedure. Finally, we present the results of the robustness checks based on testing for SUTVA, placebo
tests, and DDD estimates.
5.1. Practical implementation of DID-matching
The procedure we use is in line with the most recent developments in the literature on program evaluation as they are
presented in Todd [34]. As they are not a genuine contribution of this paper, the econometric methods are presented in the
online appendix. The first step of the estimation procedure is an estimation of a probit participation model for each AES,
where control variables are included as explanatory variables.11 We generally find that participants are indeed different
from non-participants: they are younger, more educated, work longer hours on larger farms, and are more likely to have
had previous experience with an AES. Whereas previous experience with quality labels tends to increase participation in
AES 21, technical orientation toward growing cereals increases participation in all the AESs studied in this paper except8 The full list of variables can be found in the online appendix. As Chabe´-Ferret [7] shows that controlling for pre-treatment outcomes may bias
DID-matching estimates, we also run DID-matching without controlling for pre-treatment outcomes and find similar results.
9 Direct subsidies from the CAP are a function of farm structure, which we control for. We exclude from the sample farmers benefiting from a special
indemnity for covering the soil in winter that is not a part of the AES program. Finally, our results are not sensitive to the exclusion of the small number of
farmers also benefiting from AESs subsidizing extensive livestock rearing.
10 There are approximately 36,000 communes in France. The average size of a French commune is around 7 sq.mile, which is a little less than half of the
average size of a US Census Block Group. Using commune level data thereby provides a good enough approximation for individual farm characteristics like
altitude and slope without generating large measurement errors.
11 The full results can be found in the online appendix.
Table 1
Direct and cross effects of various AESs.
0201 0205 0301 04 08 09 21
Eveness 0:05n 0.03 0:02nnn 0.03nnn 0:02nn 0:02nnn 0:07nnn
(0.03) (0.02) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.02)
Number of crops 0:85nn 0:65nnn 0:29nnn 0.37 nnn 0:22nnn 0:20nnn 0:58nnn
(0.36) (0.23) (0.07) (0.07) (0.04) (0.05) (0.14)
Area under main 0.03 0:03nnn 0:006n 0:01nnn 0.002 0.0007 0.01
crop (%UAA) (0.03) (0.01) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.01)
Area under main 2:30n 1:51nnn 1:21nnn 0.68 2:23nnn 2:20nnn 2:71nn
crop (ha) (1.34) (0.58) (0.41) (0.62) (0.36) (0.35) (1.19)
Cover crops (ha) 1.04 1:08nnn 10:66nnn 0.23 0.01 0.20 0.31
(0.79) (0.34) (1.32) (0.38) (0.54) (0.60) (0.35)
Grass buffer 119:91n 192:45nnn 7.49 243.61 13.54 30.60 17.10
strips (m) (68.30) (44.64) (38.96) (149.24) (29.67) (28.35) (40.51)
Organic farming 13.39 6.58 5.13 11.12 -0.50 7.49 46:41nnn
(ha) (45.64) (15.09) (21.07) (26.33) (12.86) (18.93) (0.13)
Under conversion 0.30 3.96 3:31n .08 1.46 1.66 4:41n
(ha) (2.57) (10.67) (1.85) (2.80) (1.73) (2.88) (2.52)
Note: Results in bold are the estimates of the direct effect of each AES on the practice it is meant to alter. Cross effects are estimated on the subgroup
receiving AES b but not receiving AES a, the one aiming at directly altering practice Ya . Estimations use LLM with an Epanechnikov kernel and bandwith
set to 0.05. Standard errors are in parentheses and are estimated by 500 bootstrapped replications for direct effects and 100 replications for cross-effects.
Asterisks denote statistical significance at 1% (nnn), 5% (nn), or 10% (n) level. UAA refers to usable agricultural area.
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studies of the determinants of participation in these AESs [9].
We then estimate the probability of participating in a given AES, conditional on the control variables (i.e. the propensity
score). Following Smith and Todd [32], we define the common support zone as the set of participants for which there exists
a sufficient density of non-participants with the same value for the propensity score.12 As shown in the online appendix,
restriction to the common support zone generally reduces the number of recipient farms by 10%. The maximum is reached
with AES 21, for which a quarter of the recipient farms have no untreated counterpart.13
Our main estimator is the local linear matching estimator based on the propensity score (LLM).14 We estimate standard
errors for LLM by using a bootstrap procedure.15 We assess the quality of the matching procedure by comparing the mean
level of the control variables of the participants to that of their matched counterparts. Results show that differences of
covariates among participants and non-participants are largely removed, meaning that the matching can be considered
successful.16
5.2. Average treatment effect on the treated estimated by DID-matching
Table 1 reports the LLM estimates of direct and crossover effects of each AES on agricultural practices. Crossover effects
are estimated by focusing on farmers not receiving the AES that has a direct effect on the practice (E½Y01a Y00a 9Db ¼ 1,
Da ¼ 0).17,18
5.2.1. Effects of the AESs on crop diversification
Two AESs are likely to directly affect crop diversification: AES 0201, which consists of introducing one new crop into the
rotation, and AES 0205, which requires having at least four different crops in the rotation. The results suggest that AES 0201 has
generally had a stronger impact on outcome variables than AES 0205 (Table 1), although there are fewer participants in AES 0201.12 The construction of the common support zone is detailed in the online appendix.
13 In order to understand how the farms on the common support differ from the average recipient farm, we run probit regressions for presence on
the common support. Results indicate that recipient farmers on the common support are older and have smaller farms and a lower education level.
14 See Imbens [17] for a detailed presentation of the various matching methods. We obtain similar results with two nearest-neighbor matching
estimators: one using the propensity score only and the other using all the control variables simultaneously. The estimation procedures are detailed in
the online appendix.
15 We perform bootstrap at the farm level. The autocorrelation problems studied by Bertrand et al. [6] are less of an issue in our application: we only
use two periods of data, and our sample is randomized at the farm level, thereby lowering the degree of spatial autocorrelation.
16 As suggested by Rosenbaum and Rubin [28], we use standardized differences to assess the quality of our adjustment. Before matching, there are
around 80 variables that exhibit large differences, whereas there is at most one large difference after matching with LLM. The full results of the balancing
tests can be found in the online appendix.
17 Estimates of E½Y11a Y10a 9Db ¼ 1,Da ¼ 1 are imprecise because of small sample size. We nevertheless have enough power to reject crossover effects
on the planting of cover crops.
18 In results not presented in this paper, we estimate the average causal effects of the AESs on practices measured in 2003 and 2005 for farmers that
have entered before 2003 and find very similar results, thereby excluding learning or vintage effects.
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AES 0201 (resp. 0205) has increased the crop diversity index by 0.05 (resp. 0.03). This is not a strong effect; the diversity index
varies from 0 to 1 and is equal to 0.77 (resp. 0.80) on the average recipient farm. On the contrary, these AESs have larger effects
on the number of crops in the rotation: they are responsible for the addition of almost one crop to the rotation (0.85 for AES 0201
and 0.65 for AES 0205). These contrasting results can be reconciled by noting that these AESs have had a very limited effect on the
area covered by the main crop; it has only decreased by approximately 2 ha, i.e. only 3% of UAA. Most of the rotation has thus
remained unchanged and the additional crop has been planted on a limited area. Crossover effects of other AESs are generally
lower than direct effects. All AESs seem to slightly increase the number of crops on the farm. AES 21 promoting organic farming
adds 0.58 crops to the farm. Other AESs increase the diversity index, but they do not decrease the area covered by the main crop.
5.2.2. Effects of the AESs on the planting of cover crops and grass buffer strips
AES 0301, which subsidizes the introduction of cover crops into the UAA, and AES 04, which subsidizes the planting of
grass buffer strips, both aim to decrease the transfer of pollutants (mainly nitrogen) to ground and surface water. Results
displayed in Table 1 show that AES 0301 has increased the area planted in cover crops, the average treatment effect on the
treated being around 10 ha. This AES has thus triggered the planting of 94,000 ha (9400 recipients * 10 ha) of additional
cover crops. This accounts for 12% of the 200% increase in the total area planted in cover crops between 2000 and 2005 in
France. The ATT for AES 04 has not been estimated using DID-estimators, the outcome variable being unobserved in 2000.
The LLM estimator suggests that participants in AES 04 have planted 240 more meters of grass buffer strips than their
matched counterparts (Table 1), although this estimate lacks precision. This AES thus triggered the planting of 1440 km
(¼6000 recipients n240 m) of grass buffer strips in 2005, which is a low figure compared to a nationwide total of
20,000 km, largely due to the eco-conditionality of common agricultural policy direct subsidies. We find evidence that the
assumption of no crossover effects is supported by the data in the case of cover crops. We also find that AESs other than 04,
0201, and 0205 do not have any significant effect on the planting of grass buffer strips, thereby largely confirming the
absence of crossover effects. The positive effects of AES 0205 may indicate that some farmers have used cover crops or
grass buffer strips to increase crop diversity on their farms.
5.2.3. Effects of the AESs on the conversion to organic farming
As in the case of the AES 04, the ATT for the AES 21, which aims to encourage the adoption of organic farming, has not
been estimated using DID estimators, because the outcome variable is unobserved in 2000. This is not likely to lead to a
large bias since farmers entering this AES were required to have no land cultivated by organic farming. Results suggest that
the impact of AES 21 on the area dedicated to organic farming and the area under conversion is significant. Table 1 shows a
difference approximating to 46 ha between the treated and control groups in the area fully converted to organic
agriculture, and a difference of 4.5 ha in the area in the process of conversion. Furthermore, we do not detect significant
crossover effects of other AESs on organic farming. These results suggest that AES 21 accounts for 90% of the almost 100%
increase in the area devoted to organic farming between 2000 and 2005 in France.
5.3. Robustness checks: diffusion effects, placebo tests, and DDD estimates
In this section, we present the results of the tests of the validity of our identifying assumptions. We focus in turn on
diffusion effects, placebo tests, and DDD matching estimates.
5.3.1. Tests of the validity of Assumption 1 (no diffusion effects)
Farmers having converted to organic farming before 2000 may generate imitation effects and/or increasing returns that
make their neighbors more likely to go organic, and also to enter the scheme paying for this conversion. This means that if
there are imitation effects, our estimates suffer from omitted variables bias: the initial proportion of a farmer’s neighbors
that has adopted the practice concerned (organic farming, cover crops) simultaneously determines selection into the
corresponding scheme and outcomes in the absence of the treatment. We test for the validity of SUTVA by adding the
initial proportion of organic farmers, and farmers planting cover crops, in the farmer’s canton as control variables. A canton
is a larger administrative subdivision containing an average of 9 communes and is thus likely to represent the extent of a
farmer’s zone of influence. Adding this control variable barely changes our estimated treatment effects for organic farming
(45.5 ha) and planting of cover crops (10.5 ha). We take this as evidence that SUTVA is not rejected by the data.
5.3.2. Tests of the validity of Assumption 2: placebo tests
Placebo tests consist of applying DID-matching to estimate the effect of receiving an AES after 2003 on the change of
practices between 2000 and 2003. Theoretically, no effect should be detected for this ‘‘treated’’ group. However, these tests
are disrupted by anticipation effects due to the unusually long period of time taken to process administrative applications
in 2003. As a consequence, we have performed these tests on groups of future participants who entered the program at
dates further and further removed from September 2003. If our interpretation of anticipation effects is correct, and if the
identification assumptions behind DID-matching are fulfilled, we should observe a progressive decrease in the placebo
effect the further removed participation is from September 2003, and we should obtain a zero effect after some time.
Results are presented in Table 2.
Table 2
Results of the placebo tests.
Outcome Sample
AES Post-Sept03 Post-Mar04 Post-Sept04 Post-Mar05 Post-Sept05
Main crop 0201 0.02 0.01 0.02 0:03n n.a.
(% UAA) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (n.a.)
Main crop 0205 0:01nnn 0:01nnn 0:01nnn 0:01n n.a.
(% UAA) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (n.a.)
Crop diversity 0201 0:03nn 0.02 0.03 0.03 n.a.
index (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.04) (n.a.)
Crop diversity 0205 0:02nnn 0:02nnn 0:01nnn 0:02n n.a.
index (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (n.a.)
Number of 0201 0.21 0.09 0.21 0.12 n.a.
crops (0.19) (0.19) (0.28) (0.31) (n.a.)
Number of 0205 0:33nnn 0:33nnn 0:35nnn 0.19 n.a.
crops (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.19) (n.a.)
Cover crops 0301 3:52nnn 3:60nnn 3:14nnn 3:34nnn 1.32
(ha) (0.60) (0.60) (0.69) (0.80) (1.02)
Organic land 21 6:71nnn 4:91nn 5:90nn 5.58 n.a.
area (ha) (2.53) (2.35) (2.65) (4.13) (n.a.)
Conversion to 21 13:96nnn 15:58nnn 4.05 4.81 n.a.
organic (ha) (4.39) (4.52) (2.51) (4.02) (n.a.)
Note : Asterisks denote statistical significance at 1% (nnn), 5% (nn), or 10% (n) level. Estimations use LLM with an Epanechnikov kernel and bandwith set to
0.05. Standard errors are in parentheses and are estimated by 500 bootstrapped replications. Details on the estimation are presented in the online
appendix. Average treatment effects are estimated successively on the post-September 2003 participants’ group, the post-March 2004 participants’
group, the post-September 2004 participants’ group, the post-March 2005 participants’ group, and the post-September 2005 participants’ group. For AES
04 only, placebo tests cannot be applied because the associated outcomes are not observed in 2003. UAA refers to usable agricultural area.
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index cannot be estimated with a high level of precision but overall the estimated average treatment effects appear to be
small. On the contrary, for AES 0205, the placebo effect on the number of crops is positive but it exhibits a decreasing time
trend coherent with anticipation behavior. For AES 0301, the average treatment effect on the cover crop area that we
estimate in 2003 on the post-September 2003 group of participants remains around 3 ha until we apply the estimator to
the post-September 2005 group of participants. The average treatment effect then falls to 1 ha, without being statistically
different from zero. Results are similar for AES 09. For AES 21, results conform to the same profile, except that anticipation
is very high but drops more rapidly; it is halved between March and September 2004. Results for participants who enter
the AES later become imprecise due to smaller sample size.
Overall, the results of the placebo tests confirm the importance of anticipation effects and suggest a small or null time-
varying selection bias. These results are consistent with our knowledge of the administrative procedure underlying the farmers’
participation in the scheme and thus tend to support the chosen identification strategy based on DID-matching. However,
insofar as we cannot totally reject the hypothesis of a divergence between the two groups, in addition to the anticipation effect,
we also turn to the triple-difference matching estimator with a view to determining a lower bound on the ATT.
5.3.3. A lower bound on treatment effects: results of triple differences estimates
We apply the triple-difference estimator, which corrects for the divergence estimated in 2003 between the participants
and their matched counterparts. This estimator compares the change in practices between 2000 and 2005 to the change
that would have happened had the 2000–2003 divergence continued at the same pace. Note that the triple-difference
estimator leads to a lower bound on the treatment effect, since it assumes that there are no anticipation effects and that all
the divergence detected in 2003 is due to time-varying selection bias.
Results of the triple-difference estimator are displayed in Table 3. As we apply this estimator to a subset of the data (only
participants entering the scheme between September 2003 and March 2005 are included in the sample), it could be that the
ATT estimated on this subpopulation is not representative of the treatment effect on the overall population of participants. In
order to have an indication of the severity of this problem, we re-estimate the ATT by DID-matching on this subpopulation.
Results are in general very close to the ones obtained on the overall population. For AES 0201, the average treatment effect on
the main crop area is a reduction of 4%, compared to a reduction of 5% when estimated by DID-matching. Moreover, the
average treatment effect on the number of crops is an increase of 0.8, compared to an increase of 1.05 when estimated by
DID-matching. Such results indicate that the lower bound for these effects remains very close to the DID-matching results.
For AES 0205, the triple-difference estimates suffer from a lack of precision. In any case, this does not modify our conclusions
based on DID-matching estimates; the DID-matching estimates already being very low, we actually expected very similar
results from the triple-difference estimator. For AES 0301, DDD-matching gives an average treatment effect on the treated of
around 5 ha, while it is around 10 ha when estimated by the DID-matching estimator. Although placebo tests clearly suggest
Table 3
Average treatment effect on the treated for AES in 2005 using DDD-matching.
Outcome AES DDD DID DID
Sep03–Mar05 Sep03–Mar05 Whole sample
ATTð1Þ ATTð2Þ ATTð3Þ
Main crop (% UAA) 0201 0:04nnn 0:05nnn 0.03
(0.02) (0.02) (0.03)
Main crop (% UAA) 0205 0.01 0:03nnn 0:03nnn
(0.01) (0.00) (0.01)
Crop diversity index 0201 0.02 0.03 0:05n
(0.03) (0.02) (0.03)
Crop diversity index 0205 0.00 0:03nnn 0.03
(0.01) (0.01) (0.02)
Number of crops 0201 0:79nn 1:05nnn 0:85nn
(0.38) (0.37) (0.36)
Number of crops 0205 0.07 0:67nnn 0:65nnn
(0.12) (0.10) (0.23)
Cover crops (ha) 0301 4:87nnn 10:46nnn 10:66nnn
(1.26) (0.97) (1.32)
Organic land area 21 14.07 45:01nnn 50:82nnn
(10.11) (6.98) (2.79)
Note: ATTð1Þ refers to the triple-difference estimates, ATTð2Þ refers to the DID-matching estimates on the same
sample (farmers who entered the AES between September 2003 and March 2005), and ATTð3Þ refers to the
DID-matching estimates on the whole sample (farmers who entered the AES before March 2005). UAA refers to
usable agricultural area. Estimations use LLM with an Epanechnikov kernel and bandwith set to 0.05. Standard
errors are in parentheses and are estimated by 500 bootstrapped replications.
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exhibits significantly positive additionality effects. Finally, for AES 21, the triple-difference results do not allow a lower
bound to be provided with precision. However, here again, in accordance with the placebo test results, we can reasonably
suppose that DID-matching results are to be preferred and we cannot exclude a large effect of this AES.
6. How much green for the buck? A tentative cost-benefit analysis
In this section, we insert our estimates of additionality and windfall effects into a cost-benefit framework. We analyze
each AES separately, and we take into account direct effects only, which is reasonable in view of the limited extent of
crossover effects that we find. First, we present a simple framework integrating ATT and windfall effects into a cost-benefit
framework. We define a break-even point in the social benefit generated by the AES, above which the total net benefit in
the presence of the AES is superior to the total net benefit in the absence of the AES. Second, we calculate this break-even
point for each of the AESs under study. To do this, we combine our ATT estimates with data on costs extracted from the
administrative files. Third, we compare the break-even point to estimates, taken from the literature, of the social benefit
generated by the various agricultural practices we study. The results of these calculations are presented in Table 4.
6.0.4. A framework for cost-benefit analysis
Using Assumption 4 (no crossover effects), we can study each AES separately. The variation of social welfare due to the
implementation of a given AES can be measured by the sum of the compensating variation of farmers and consumers.
However, we do not study farmers’ surplus in this paper because we lack data on profits. We thus adopt a taxpayer’s view
on the program and focus on consumers’ surplus. We assume that the benefit from a practice is proportional to its average
level. B measures the social benefit from one unit of practice Y. The total benefit generated under the scheme is thus:
E½Y19D¼ 1B, where E½Y19D¼ 1 is the area subject to the practice in the average treated farm when it receives treatment.
We consider only the direct costs of the program, i.e. direct payments to farmers, disregarding administrative costs, and
deadweight loss due to taxation. Costs associated with the scheme are thus per hectare payments (C) multiplied by the
total area for which the farmer receives payment: E½Yp9D¼ 1C. Yp, the area for which the farmer gets paid, can be different
from Y1. It can be lower if the farmer declares more than she plants or higher if the total area subject to the practice is
capped and there are increasing returns from the practice at the farm level. When the treatment is implemented, the net
benefit is thus: E½Y19D¼ 1BE½Yp9D¼ 1C. This has to be compared with the benefit that would have been reached had the
program not been implemented: E½Y09D¼ 1B, where E½Y09D¼ 1 is the counterfactual level of practice Y. Consumer
surplus from the AES is thus equal to:
CS¼ E½Y19D¼ 1BE½Yp9D¼ 1CE½Y09D¼ 1B ð19Þ
Table 4
Cost-benefit analysis of various AESs on the average treated farm.
AES 0201 0205 0301 04 21
Payment (h) (P) 2 271 4 356 1 392 421 7 667
Area under contract (ha) (E½Yp9D¼ 1) 13.50 124.75 20.54 4.51 47.20
Observed area subject to the practice (ha) (E½Y19D¼ 1) 17.24 1.02 54.71
Declarative error (ha) (E) 3.30 3.49 7.51
Additional treatment effect (ha) (ATT) 2.30 1.51 10.66 0.24 50.82
Windfall effect (ha) (W) 6.58 0.78 3.89
Cost per area under contract (C) 168 35 68 93 162
Cost per area subject to the practice (C2) 81 413 140
Cost per unit of additional treatment effect (Bn) 987.37 2884.77 131 1 754 151
Social benefit per unit of additional treatment effect (B) 0:7nNa 1:6
nNb 540
Note: We cannot apply formula (21) to AESs 0201 and 0205 because payments are not tied to a given practice. We calculate the cost per additional area
not planted with the main crop, obtained from estimates not presented in the previous sections. Na is the number of units of N-fertilizer whose leaching
is prevented by 1 ha of cover crops. Nb is the number of units of N-fertilizer whose runoff is prevented by 1 m of grass buffer strips. Sample: treated farms
on the common support.
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¼ E½Y1Y09D¼ 1|fflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflffl{zfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflffl}
ATT
ðBCÞ E½YpY19D¼ 1|fflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflffl{zfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflffl}
E
þE½Y09D¼ 1|fflfflfflfflfflfflfflffl{zfflfflfflfflfflfflfflffl}
W
0
B@
1
CAC: ð21Þ
After rearranging, Eq. (21) shows that consumer surplus depends on the level of additionality of the program, measured by
the ATT, on the level of discrepancy or declarative error E and on the windfall effectW. We say that the AES is cost-effective
whenever CS40, i.e. when the social benefit B is superior to a break-even point Bn 19
Bn ¼ ATTþWþE
ATT
C, ð22Þ
where Bn increases with W and E and decreases with ATT.
6.0.5. Toward a cost-benefit analysis
As a first step towards a cost-benefit analysis, we calculate the cost per hectare of the additional treatment effect (Bn)
for each AES. We then compare the unit costs to estimates of the social benefit of the practices promoted by each AES. We
measure C directly by dividing total payments by the total area under contract for each farmer. ATT comes from the LLM
estimates of the previous section. W is calculated as the difference between the observed level of the practice and the ATT.
E is the difference between the level of the practice for which the farmer gets paid (i.e. the total area subject to the AES)
and the level we measure in the 2005 farm survey. As an intermediate step, we also calculate the cost per hectare of
observed area subject to the practice (C2), by dividing average payments by the average observed area subject to the
practice.20 Finally, we provide estimates of the social benefit B taken from the literature.
As reported in Table 4, in the case of AES 0301 (planting of cover crops), the average area under contract (21 ha) is
slightly larger than that which we actually measured from survey data (17 ha), which suggests that some farmers
committed to planting more cover crops than they actually did. This translates into a higher cost per observed (81 h) than
per declared (68 h) planted area. Moreover, the additional treatment effect (11 ha) is equal to 60% of the planted area
under cover crops, so that the windfall effect (6.58 ha) is large. Thus, almost 40% of the planted cover crops area would
have been sown by participants, even in the absence of AES 0301. Mechanically, this windfall effect translates into a larger
cost per planted area than per subsidized area; we indeed estimate a cost of 131 h per additional hectare of cover crops,
while the mean premium for such AES is only 68 h per hectare. Comparing this to an estimate of the social cost of 1 kg of
N-fertilizer leaching from the field provided by van Grinsven et al. [35] 0:7 h per kg—suggests a poor cost-efficiency
of AES 0301.21 Indeed, for this AES to be cost-efficient would require 1 ha of cover crop to prevent the leaching19 Note that this condition does not account for farmers’ surplus. We expect it to be positive though because there is free entry into the program (this
is implied by our model, conditional on I). Rigorously, this is thus a sufficient condition for cost effectiveness.
20 For the sake of consistency, we focus on farms lying on the common support.
21 We have only been able to find one study assessing the social costs associated with the pollution of drinking water by nitrates [35].
Epidemiological studies suggest that colon cancer may possibly be associated with nitrates in drinking water [11]. Taking the increased risk of colon
cancer from a case-control study from Iowa, the authors extrapolate the results to assess the social cost for 11 EU member states by using data on
incidence of cancer, nitrogen leaching, and drinking water supply. They estimate the associated increase in the incidence of colon cancer from nitrate
contamination of groundwater-based drinking water at 3%, which corresponds to 0:7 h per kg of nitrate-N leaching from fertilizers.
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and of increased biological and landscape diversity is taken into account the cost-effectiveness of this measure would be
improved.
In the case of AES 21, farmers converted more land to organic farming than they were paid for, so that E is negative.
This is probably due to a combination of increasing returns and an informal cap on subsidized area. There is nevertheless a
positive windfall effect: in the end, the cost per additional treatment effect is only slightly lower than the cost per
subsidized area. Finally, subsidizing the conversion to organic farming could be highly cost effective: it costs 151 h per
hectare, whereas some studies tend to show that the average social benefit from organic farming is higher. For example,
Sandhu et al. [31] estimate the average benefit of organic farming relative to conventional farming to be 540 h per hectare
per year.22
For grass buffer strips (AES 04), in order to compare our estimates with data from administrative records, we convert the
ATT into hectares, under the assumption that a grass buffer strip is 10 m wide. Surprisingly, the average area under contract
appears five times larger than the data from the survey would suggest.23 Moreover, there is a large windfall effect and thus a
very small treatment effect. This translates into a cost of almost 1800 h per additional hectare of grass buffer strips, while the
mean premium for such AES is only 93 h per hectare. Lankoski and Ollikainen [20] use an estimate of 1:6 h per kg of N-fertilizer
for the social cost from nitrogen runoff.24 To reach cost-effectiveness, buffer strips thus have to prevent the runoff of 1800/
(1000n1.6)¼1.1 t of N-fertilizer per hectare. Cost-effectiveness thus depends on the size of the watershed that leads to the
buffer strip. For example, with an assumed 80% efficiency of the buffer strip and runoffs of 14 kgN/ha, 1 km of a 10-m wide
buffer strip has to have a cropped watershed of 100 ha to ensure that the social benefits from this AES exceed its costs
(14n100n0.8/1000¼1.1). Moreover, reduced runoff of phosphorus and pesticides and increased biodiversity should also be
taken into account. It thus seems that, despite high associated windfall effects, AES 04 could very well be cost-effective.
We cannot apply formula (21) to AESs 0201 and 0205 because payments are not tied to a given practice. We calculate
that AES 0201 (resp. 0205) reduces area planted with the main crop by 2.30 ha (resp. 1.51 ha) on average. This translates
into a cost per additional area not planted with the main crop of 990 h=ha (resp. 2900 h=ha).7. Conclusion
AESs share with all voluntary programs the potential for large adverse selection. It is even possible that they only
attract farmers that would comply with the requirements in the absence of payments, thereby generating no additional
effects. Overall, we find that the French AESs that we study do not fit with this extreme scenario. All the AESs exhibit
positive additional effects, even with the most stringent identification strategy. We find that the AESs which impose strong
requirements, such as the AES aiming to subsidize conversion to organic farming, have large additional effects and almost
nonexistent windfall effects. On the contrary, we find that the AESs with modest aims, such as the AES only requiring
farmers to add one crop to the rotation, have generated very limited additional effects.
For the AESs suffering from large windfall effects, such as the one aiming to subsidize the planting of cover crops, the
comparison of the cost per hectare of additional treatment effects with estimates of social benefits taken from the literature
suggests that this AES may not be cost-effective. On the contrary, the AESs for which the windfall effects are small or even null
may be cost-effective. The AES aiming to subsidize conversion to organic farming is a case in point. Because it was directed at
conventional farmers only, the extent of windfall effects is extremely small and cost-effectiveness is high. Denying subsidies to
farmers that adopt green practices out of goodwill is nevertheless ethically debatable. Formalizing this trade-off between ethics
and efficiency is a nice avenue for further research, for example using insights from fair taxation [12].
Much remains to be done to improve the insertion of treatment effect estimates into a fully-fledged cost-benefit
framework. Estimating farmers’ surpluses from the AES would be a first step. More importantly, estimating the spatial22 To our knowledge no assessment of the social value of organic farming is available for France, but at least two empirical studies may be used as
approximations. Sandhu et al. [31] estimated the economic value of various ecosystem services provided on arable landscapes in New Zealand. They
conducted field experiments to assess a dozen ecosystem services, such as biological control of pests, services provided by shelter-belts and hedges,
nitrogen fixation or mineralization of plant nutrients. For example, the economic value of the biological control of aphids and flies was estimated on the
basis of avoided cost of pesticides using their cost in New Zealand. Taking the difference between the estimated value of ecosystem services in organic
fields and in conventional fields, they obtained an estimate of 540 euros per hectare per year. Lankoski and Ollikainen [20] report an alternative estimate
of the social benefit associated with organic farming suggested by Aakkula [1], who used the contingent valuation method to elicit a monetary value for
conversion from conventional agriculture to pro-environmental farming in Finland and found an average willingness to pay of 78:4 h per hectare.
Without any evidence of the superiority of one assessment over the other, we do not exclude the idea that subsidizing conversion to organic farming can
be highly cost effective.
23 People in charge of conducting the farm surveys acknowledged that there is a large error in the measurement of the length of grass buffer strips.
This is the most likely explanation of the large discrepancy we find.
24 To the best of our knowledge, there is no study providing an estimate of the social value of reductions in nutrient runoff based on French data.
Following Lankoski and Ollikainen [20], we thus use an estimate provided by Vehkasalo [36] who approximated the social benefits of reducing nitrogen
runoffs from Finnish farmland by applying the avoided expenditure method. He estimated the costs associated with nitrogen reduction at municipal
wastewater treatment facilities and found 1:6 h per kg of nitrogen reduced (for 10–20 % reduction). In more recent studies, Lankoski and Ollikainen [21]
drew on Gren [13]’s estimates of the willingness to pay for nutrient load reduction in the Baltic Sea (4:27 h for 1 kg reduction in nitrogen). However, such
estimates appear too remote from our subject and we prefer to keep to the avoided expenditure estimate, which appears to be less related to
geographical features.
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Finally, estimating the treatment effects of the AESs directly on the environment remains an essential but very difficult
undertaking. Kleijn et al. [19] provide evidence that AESs in the EU enhance common biodiversity. To our knowledge, we
lack the same type of evidence for the effects of AESs on water quality.Acknowledgments
We thank Gilles Allaire, Soren Anderson, Pierre Dupraz, Nate Higgins, Etienne Josien, Nathanael Pingault, Elisabeth Sadoulet,
Michel Simioni, Ed Vytlacil, and seminar participants at Cerdi (Clermont-Ferrand), MAP (Paris), Smart (Rennes), SupAgro
(Montpellier), the University of Chicago, Toulouse School of Economics, the 4th World Congress of Environmental and Resource
Economics in Montreal, the 4th INRA/SFER/CIRAD workshop in Rennes, and the OECD workshop on the evaluation of agro-
environmental schemes in Braunschweig for their useful comments and suggestions. We thank Olivier Debeuf and Cedric
Gendre for helping us to handle the data. We thank Jean-Franc-ois Baschet and Gabriel Lecat for their constant support and we
gratefully acknowledge financial support from the FrenchMinistries of Agriculture (program 215, action 02-23) and Sustainable
Development (program 217, action 01-13). We especially thank the co-editor, Marty Smith, and three anonymous referees for
their outstanding comments and suggestions. All remaining errors are obviously our own.
References
[1] J. Aakkula, Economic value of pro-environmental farming: a critical and decision-making oriented application of the contingent valuation method,
Discussion Paper, Agricultural Economics Research Institute, Helsinki, Finland, 1999.
[2] A. Abadie, Semiparametric difference-in-differences estimators, Review of Economic Studies 72 (1) (2005) 1–19.
[3] J.H. Abbring, J.J. Heckman, Econometric evaluation of social programs, part III: distributional treatment effects, dynamic treatment effects, dynamic
discrete choice, and general equilibrium policy evaluation, in: J.J. Heckman, E.E. Leamer (Eds.), Handbook of Econometrics, vol. 6, Elsevier, 2007,
pp. 5145–5303. Part 2, chap. 72.
[4] W.R.Q. Anton, G. Deltas, M. Khanna, Incentives for environmental self-regulation and implications for environmental performance, Journal of
Environmental Economics and Management 48 (1) (2004) 632–654.
[5] T.H. Arimura, A. Hibiki, H. Katayama, Is a voluntary approach an effective environmental policy instrument?: A case for environmental management
systems, Journal of Environmental Economics and Management 55 (3) (2008) 281–295.
[6] M. Bertrand, E. Duflo, S. Mullainathan, How much should we trust differerences in differences estimates? Quarterly Journal of Economics 119 (1)
(2004) 249–275.
[7] S. Chabe´-Ferret, To control or not to control ? Bias of simple vs difference-in-difference matching in a dynamic framework, in: 10th Econometric
Society World Congress (ESWC), Shanghai, China, 2010.
[8] S. Dasgupta, H. Hettige, D. Wheeler, What improves environmental compliance? Evidence from Mexican industry, Journal of Environmental
Economics and Management 39 (1) (2000) 39–66.
[9] G. Ducos, P. Dupraz, F. Bonnieux, Agri-environment contract adoption under fixed and variable compliance costs, Journal of Environmental Planning
and Management 52 (5) (2009) 669–687.
[10] M. Fall, T. Magnac, How valuable is on-farm work to farmers? American Journal of Agricultural Economics 86 (1) (2004) 267–281.
[11] A. Fan, Nitrate and nitrite in drinking water: a toxicological review, in: Jerome O. Nriagu (Ed.), Encyclopedia of Environmental Health, ed. Elsevier,
Burlington, 2011, pp. 137–145.
[12] M. Fleurbaey, F. Maniquet, Fair income tax, Review of Economic Studies 73 (1) (2006) 55–83.
[13] I.-M. Gren, International versus national actions against nitrogen pollution of the Baltic Sea, Environmental & Resource Economics 20 (1) (2001)
41–59.
[14] J.J. Heckman, V.J. Hotz, Choosing among alternative nonexperimental methods for estimating the impact of social programs: the case of manpower
training, Journal of the American Statistical Association 84 (408) (1989) 862–874.
[15] J.J. Heckman, H. Ichimura, P.E. Todd, Matching as an econometric evaluation estimator: evidence from evaluating a job training programme, The
Review of Economic Studies 64 (4, Special Issue: Evaluation of Training and Other Social Programmes) (1997) 605–654.
[16] P.W. Holland, Statistics and causal inference, Journal of the American Statistical Association 81 (1986) 945–970.
[17] G.W. Imbens, Nonparametric estimation of average treatment effects under exogeneity: a review, The Review of Economics and Statistics 86 (1)
(2004) 4–29.
[18] M. Khanna, L.A. Damon, EPA’s voluntary 33/50 program: impact on toxic releases and economic performance of firms, Journal of Environmental
Economics and Management 37 (1) (1999) 1–25.
[19] D. Kleijn, R.A. Baquero, Y. Clough, M. Diaz, J. Esteban, F. Fernandez, D. Gabriel, F. Herzog, A. Holzschuh, R. Johl, E. Knop, A. Kruess, E.J.P. Marshall,
I. Steffan-Dewenter, T. Tscharntke, J. Verhulst, T.M. West, J.L. Yela, Mixed biodiversity benefits of agri-environment schemes in five European
countries, Ecology Letters 9 (3) (2006) 243–254.
[20] J. Lankoski, M. Ollikainen, Agri-environmental externalities: a framework for designing targeted policies, European Review of Agricultural
Economics 30 (1) (2003) 51–75.
[21] J. Lankoski, M. Ollikainen, Biofuel policies and the environment: Do climate benefits warrant increased production from biofuel feedstocks?
Ecological Economics 70 (4) (2011) 676–687.
[22] R.E. Lopez, Estimating labor supply and production decisions of self-employed farm producers, European Economic Review 24 (1) (1984) 61–82.
[23] L. Lynch, W. Gray, J. Geoghegan, Are farmland preservation program easement restrictions capitalized into farmland prices? what can a propensity
score matching analysis tell us? Review of Agricultural Economics 29 (3) (2007) 502–509.
[24] L. Lynch, X. Liu, Impact of designated preservation areas on rate of preservation and rate of conversion: preliminary evidence, American Journal of
Agricultural Economics 89 (5) (2007) 1205–1210.
[25] A. Pufahl, C.R. Weiss, Evaluating the effects of farm programmes: results from propensity score matching, European Review of Agricultural
Economics 36 (1) (2009) 79–101.
[26] M.J. Roberts, S. Bucholtz, Slippage in the conservation reserve program or spurious correlation? a comment, American Journal of Agricultural
Economics 87 (1) (2005) 244–250.
[27] M.J. Roberts, R.N. Lubowski, Enduring impacts of land retirement policies: evidence from the conservation reserve program, Land Economics 83 (4)
(2007) 516–538.
[28] P.R. Rosenbaum, D.B. Rubin, Constructing a control group using multivariate matched sampling methods that incorporate the propensity score, The
American Statistician 39 (1) (1985) 33–38.
S. Chabe´-Ferret, J. Subervie / Journal of Environmental Economics and Management 65 (2013) 12–27 27[29] D.B. Rubin, Bayesian inference for causal effects: the role of randomization, The Annals of Statistics 6 (1) (1978) 34–58.
[30] J. Rust, Optimal replacement of GMC bus engines: an empirical model of Harold Zurcher, Econometrica 55 (5) (1987) 999–1033.
[31] H.S. Sandhu, S.D. Wratten, R. Cullen, B. Case, The future of farming: the value of ecosystem services in conventional and organic arable land. An
experimental approach, Ecological Economics 64 (4) (2008) 835–848.
[32] J.A. Smith, P.E. Todd, Does matching overcome lalonde’s critique of nonexperimental estimators? Journal of Econometrics 125 (1-2) (2005) 305–353.
[33] V.H. Smith, B.K. Goodwin, An ex post evaluation of the conservation reserve, federal crop insurance, and other government programs: program
participation and soil erosion, Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics 28 (02) (2003).
[34] P.E. Todd, Evaluating social programs with endogenous program placement and selection of the treated, in: T.P. Schultz, J.A. Strauss (Eds.), Handbook
of Development Economics, vol. 4, Elsevier, 2007, pp. 3847–3894. chapter 60.
[35] H. van Grinsven, A. Rabl, T. de Kok, Estimation of incidence and social cost of colon cancer due to nitrate in drinking water in the eu: a tentative cost-
benefit assessment, Environmental Health 9 (1) (2010) 58.
[36] V. Vehkasalo, Ympa¨risto¨tuen Yhteiskunnallinen Kannattavuus, Discussion Paper, Agricultural Economics Research Institute, Helsinki, Finland, 1999.
[37] J. Wu, Slippage effects of the conservation reserve program, American Journal of Agricultural Economics 82 (4) (2000) 979–992.
[38] J. Wu, R.M. Adams, C.L. Kling, K. Tanaka, From microlevel decisions to landscape changes: an assessment of agricultural conservation policies,
American Journal of Agricultural Economics 86 (1) (2004) 26–41.
